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STUDENTS' RIGHTS TO ORGANIZE AND
MEET FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES
IN THE UNIVERSITY CONTEXT
DON HOWARTH*
WILLIAM

D.

CONNELL**

INTRODUCTION

Within the past few years, students on college campuses have
on numerous occasions been faced with an administrative policy that
significantly restricted or completely eliminated their rights to associate and meet on the campus to engage in religious discussion and
fellowship for which the respective groups were formed.' The adminPartner in Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Los Angeles, California.
Associate of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, San Jose, California.
1. At a community college in California, students recently decided to form a
group at the college to engage in Christian fellowship, prayer, and Bible study. With
the assistance of a Christian faculty member and a local staff worker for Inter-Varsity
Christian Fellowship, the students undertook to complete the requirements for official
recognition established by the Board of Trustees and administrators of the college, including: (1) finding a volunteer faculty member to act as the group's advisor; (2) drafting and presenting a written statement of purpose and club constitution to the appropriate student/faculty committee for official approval; and, (3) submitting a petition
for recognition to that committee.
The students set forth plainly in their statement of purpose that the club was to
be a "non-denominational Christian group, with membership and meetings open to all
students at the College, for the purpose of glorifying God, sharing [their] faith in
Christ as Lord and Savior of [their] lives, and helping others to learn about Christ and
become more mature in their faith through Bible Study, prayer, sharing, and Christian
Fellowship." Although the open.declaration that the group was formed for a manifestly
religious purpose created some concern among committee members, the petition was
approved, and Campus Christian Fellowship (CCF) became an officially recognized student association at the college.
Official recognition normally entitles a club to several benefits not otherwise
available, including: (1) the right to obtain student body funding generated by an activities fee charged to all student body members; (2) the right to participate as a
group in various campus wide functions; (3) the right to publicize club activities on
campus bulletin boards and grounds; and, (4) the right to conduct club meetings and
activities in campus facilities, both during regular, semi-weekly periods set aside by
the college for club activities and at other times, subject to availability and to various
time, place, and manner restrictions.
In the case of CCF, however, the college administration informed the students
that, despite the club's status as an officially recognized association, CCF members
would not be permitted to meet on campus grounds for the purpose of Bible study,
prayer, singing of hymns, or other "religious" expression or conduct. In short, although
the students were assured that meeting for "social purposes" was permissible, the college expressly and absolutely denied use of campus facilities for the religious activities
*

**
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istration typically seeks to justify the policy as being compelled by
state law or regulation, the state constitution, or the United States
Constitution. The affected groups normally attempt, both on their
own and with the aid of counsel, to obtain a change of the policy
through informal means. In some cases, the informal resolution process has ended in a workable compromise. In others, the situtation
has resulted in the filing of litigation by the affected groups to
challenge the prohibitory regulation. Nevertheless, where informal
efforts have failed, it is likely, given the nature of the organizations,
that many affected groups have chosen not to litigate, but merely to
for which the students expressly formed CCF. When the students inquired as to the
reason for this policy, the Dean of Student Affairs informed them that allowing the
group to use campus facilities for those activities would amount to an "establishment
of religion" by the college and was, therefore, prohibited by the Constitutions of the
United States and of California.
Following informal and unsuccessful efforts to have this policy changed, the
students sought a suitable off-campus location for their weekly Bible studies. However,
the time pressure and inconvenience of having to travel off campus during the
designated club meeting time, as well as the lack of a regularly available place to
meet, soon led many of the students to stop participating in club activities and
meetings. In addition, the club lost visibility on campus, and new members virtually
disappeared. In short, as a result of the college's policy, the club effectively ceased to
function as a student organization.
The students continued to make efforts to resolve the matter through meetings
with the appropriate administrators and then with the Office of the County Counsel,
which represented the college. These meetings did not prove fruitful, however, as the
administrators and county attorneys continued to insist that various state laws and
regulations, as well as the establishment clause of the first amendment, prohibited the
club from meeting on campus for religious purposes, even if those meetings were
voluntary, student-initiated, extracurricular, and conducted in a non-disruptive manner
similar to that of all other campus groups. The students ultimately decided to file suit
against the college as the only effective means of protecting their constitutional rights.
Subsequent to the filing of the suit, an amicable settlement was reached, and the suit
was dismissed. Campus Christian Fellowship v. Santa Monica College, No. CV-8004419-AAH (C.D. Cal., filed Oct. 3, 1980).
See also, Dittman v. Western Wash. Univ. No. C-79-1189V (D. Wash., Feb. 27,
1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-3120 (9th Cir., Apr. 7, 1980), discussed in text accompanying notes 118-24 infra.
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom Widmar
, 101 S. Ct. 1345 (1980), discussed in text accompanying notes
U.S. __
v. Vincent, __
125-31 infra. Briefs and other materials relating to Dittman and to Chess may be obtained from the Center for Law and Religious Freedom, 1776 Massachusetts Ave. NW,
Suite # 700, Washington, D.C. 20036.
See also Keegan v. University of Del., 349 A.2d 14 (Del. 1975), cert. denied sub
nom University of Del. v. Keegan, 424 U.S. 934, reh. denied, 425 U.S. 945 (1976). The
authors have been informed by various staff members with Inter-Varsity Christian
Fellowship and other organizations that similar situations are being encountered on
state campuses in several states.
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attempt to live with the policy despite the many significant burdens
imposed by it. In the end, the groups may even cease to be viable
organizations.
Such a burden on the students' right to associate on campus for
religious purposes is not only extremely unfortunate, it is also contrary to the relevant constitutional principles. These principles are
currently under review by the United States Supreme Court, which
has recently heard arguments on the appeal of the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Chess v. Widmar. In that
decision, the Court of Appeals upheld the right of a student group
to meet on campus for religious purposes and struck down the
policy relied upon by the University of Missouri-Kansas City The
Court's decision promises to be one of the most significant students'
rights decisions in several years. Accordingly, it is appropriate to
analyze the background against which that decision will be made.
There are a wide variety of factual and constitutional issues
that must be addressed in determining the extent to which student
groups must be allowed to organize and meet on a given campus for
religious expression and activities. The topic raises such factual
issues as policies and procedures for official recognition of student
groups by the college, general accessibility of the college facilities
for student use, ability of students to publicize group activities and
distribute literature on the campus, disbursement and accounting of
student activities funding, and university policies regarding nonstudent speakers and other individuals on the campus.
These factual issues in turn go to the heart of the first and
fourteenth amendments. Both of the "religion clauses" of the first
amendment-the prohibitions against laws "respecting an establishment of religion" and against laws "prohibiting the free exercise
thereof"-are implicated, as are the guarantees of freedom of
speech and association. In addition, the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment is clearly relevant to policies that appear
to single out the affected groups and deny them recognition, use of
facilities, or other generally-granted benefits solely because of the
religious subject matter of their expression, activities, or goals.
Thus, it is clear that consideration of this topic cannot be confined
to a single, discreet area of first amendment jurisprudence. Instead,
a complete examination must attempt to reconcile at least four
broad first amendment doctrines that have developed under markedly different circumstances.
2.

Cert. grantedsub nom Widmar v. Vincent,
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Before commencing a review of these doctrines, however, one
threshold limitation on the discussion must be noted. This limitation
is based upon the distinction between private universities and state
colleges. It is well-settled that some level of state action (or a suitable substitute therefore) by an entity is necessary for its policies
and regulations to be directly subject to the provisions of the first
and fourteenth amendments. This discussion is intended to deal solely
with the constitutional rights of students in educational institutions,
so it is assumed throughout that the requisite state action exists. As
a result, the question of what circumstances may suffice to transform the activities of an ostensibly private university into state action, although very important, is not considered here.'
The following discussion briefly traces the development of each
of the most relevant constitutional doctrines and then applies these
doctrines concurrently to the various factual issues presented. Part
I provides a brief background discussion of the historical development of students' constitutional rights in the academic context. Part
II focuses on general protections of, and limitations on, religious
speech and association in the context of the "public forum." Part III
reviews the case law dealing with religious exercises in the public
schools. Part IV examines the mode of analysis that the Court has
developed to deal with establishment clause questions, particularly
in the context of financial aid to religious schools. Finally, drawing
together these four lines of constitutional law, Part V first examines
the few directly relevant decisions and then discusses individually
several of the specific issues likely to be confronted by student
religious groups seeking to be active on the public campus.
I.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
IN THE UNIVERSITY CONTEXT

A. Early Treatment: The "Privilege"Doctrine and Federal
Judicial Abstention
The extensive consideration of students' rights cases in the
federal courts during the past decade belies the fact that recognition
of such rights under the Constitution is a relatively recent phenomenon, especially at the college level." Indeed, although the applicabil3. See "Freedom of PoliticalAssociation on the Campus" The Right to Official Recognition," 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1149, 1151 N.15 (1971); Hendrickson, 'State Action' and Private Higher Education, 2 J. OF L. & EDUC. 58 (1973); Developments in the
Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV L. REV. 1045, 1056-65 (1968).
4. See, Beyond Tinker and Healy Applying the First Amendment to Student Activities, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1700 (1978) [hereinafter Beyond Tinker]; Students'
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ity of the first amendment in public schools was clearly recognized
by the Supreme Court in 1943,1 the view that education at a public
college was a "privilege," governed by state law and not entitled to
full constitutional review and protection at the federal level, was expressed by at least one federal court as late as 1959.8
The premiere affirmation of the "privilege" doctrine occurred
in 1934 when the Supreme Court ruled that religious conscientious
objectors had no federal cause of action to challenge a state university admissions policy requiring every student to participate in an
ROTC program.7 The plaintiffs challenged the policy on the grounds
that the mandatory nature of the program violated their first
amendment right to free exercise of religion since it forced them to
act in conflict with the pacifistic belief of their religious faith. The
Court, however, found that the state had merely granted the
students the "privilege" of attending the university and that the
students were free to refuse that "privilege," thus removing any
problem of coercion and, with it, any claim under the free exercise
clause.'
The federal judicial abstention that resulted from application of
this doctrine in the students' rights area was further buttressed by
traditional acceptance of the view that the state's exercise of control
over student conduct was justified in loco parentis.9 Under this
view, states were perceived as possessing broad delegated power
necessary to maintain order among the students in their parents'
absence. Deferring to this view, the courts allowed administrations
wide discretion in the exercise of regulations seen as necessary to
protect social, physical, and moral welfare on campus.
In the 1950's and 1960's, however, the privilege doctrine and its
supporting views came under pressure from significant social, educational, political, and constitutional changes. In response to these
pressures, the abstention of earlier decisions gave way to active
Constitutional Rights on Public Campuses, 58 VA. L. REV. 552 (1972) [hereinafter
Students' Rights].
5. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(First amendment prohibited state from compelling Jehovah's Witnesses to engage in
flag salute ceremony during the school day).
6. See Steier v. New York Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 966 (1960).
7. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 265 (1934).
8. In the subsequent decision of West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, the Court distinguished Hamilton on the ground that higher
education is not compulsory.
9. See Beyond Tinker, supra note 4, at 1701.
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recognition and protection by federal courts of student constitutional rights on campus. Indeed, federal courts at the district and
circuit level began to protect constitutional rights in the academic
context years before such protection was formally ratified by the
Supreme Court in the late 1960's and early 1970's.
The primary social change was the development of the perception that higher education was no longer a privilege to be enjoyed
by the few, but a fundamental educational opportunity to be made
available at every level of society. Attendance at colleges and universities, especially those operated by the states, increased dramatically during the post-World War II years."
The increased social significance of college education brought
about a corresponding increase in government funding and regulatory involvement in higher education." This fundamental educational
development-significantly greater state participation in what was
formerly a largely "private" field -necessarily led to greater judicial
focus on the subject of students' rights. Where state action regulates activities in forums such as universities, whose primary function is to serve as "a marketplace of ideas,"" constitutional conflicts,
with the resulting need to define and protect constitutional rights,
are almost inevitable.
The third major force that provided repeated occasions for
greater judicial involvement in the university context was the widespread campus unrest engendered by the civil rights and peace
movements of the 1960's. Indeed, the general political unrest that
characterized that decade was more apparent on college campuses
than anywhere else. Courts were simply left with no alternative but
to deal with the repeated conflicts that arose from college officials'
efforts to maintain order on campus and students' challenges, both
peaceful and violent, to these efforts. As a result, the foundation for
the existing structure of the students' rights doctrine was constructed to a great extent within the context of the protest activities of the 1960's and 1970's.
Finally, developments in constitutional interpretation generally, such as the expanding application of the Bill of Rights to states'
activities through the fourteenth amendment, set the constitutional
stage for dismissal of the "privilege" concept in the specific context

10.
11.
12.

See Students' Rights, supra note 4, at 554.
Id.
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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of the academic environment. In this sense, the widespread recognition of student constitutional rights merely reflected greater recognition and protection of similar rights in the community at large.
B.

Tinker and Healy: The Landmark Supreme Court Decisions

Against this background of growing recognition by lower
courts of students' rights in the academic environment,"3 the
Supreme Court handed down two decisions, one in 1969 and one in
1972, that now serve as the starting point in virtually every students' rights case in the first amendment context: Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District' and Healy v.
James."
In Tinker, three high school students were suspended for wearing armbands during school hours in protest of the Vietnam War.
The students brought suit against the school administrators, alleging that the suspension constituted an infringement of their first
amendment rights. Despite the absence of any evidence that the students' conduct resulted in substantial disruption of the school's functioning, the district court and court of appeals dismissed the complaint, holding that the suspension was a justifiable exercise of the
school administrators' power to maintain order in the academic environment of the campus."
The Supreme Court reversed, noting that the wearing of armbands amounted to "symbolic speech" and that such expression was
clearly entitled to constitutional protection, even when engaged in
on the school campus. 7 In an oft-quoted phrase, the Court noted:
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued
that either students or teachers shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."
13. It is significant to note that, prior to these "landmark" Supreme Court
decisions, many lower courts had already adopted substantially similar positions
recognizing and protecting student's constitutional rights in the academic environment.
See, e.g., Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
14. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
15. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
16. 258 F. Supp. 971, 973 (S.D. Iowa 1966), aff'd 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967).
17. 393 U.S. at 514.
18. Id. at 506.
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Thus, the Court concluded, "[in the absence of a specific showing of
constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are
entitled to freedom of expression of their views."' 9
In defining what would pass muster as "constitutionally valid
reasons," in light of the "special characteristics of the school environment," the Court set forth a fairly specific test. Under this test,
restrictions on students' freedom of expression can only be justified
by a showing that the prohibited activities or expressions:
(1) "materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of
the school," or (2) constitute an invasion of the rights of others. 0
The Court further held that any prior restraint on student expression cannot be justified by mere speculation, but requires a showing
of "facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to
forecast substantial disruption or of material interference with
school activities ...
"21An "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression."22 Because the record in Tinker contained "no evidence
whatever of petitioner's interference, actual or nascent, with the
school's work or of collision with the rights of other students to be
secure and to be let alone," the suspension was held to constitute an
unconstitutional infringement of plaintiffs' first amendment rights. 3
In Healy v. James, the Court affirmed the basic reasoning of
Tinker and extended it in two significant respects. The plaintiffs in
Healy were students at Central Connecticut State College who formed
a local chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and
sought official recognition of the chapter as a campus organization.
Although the students complied with all of the established procedures for obtaining recognition and their petition was approved by
the appropriate committee, the president of the college rejected the
recommendation of the committee and ruled that the group "was not
to be accorded the benefits of official recognition." 4 The president
justified his decision on the grounds that: (1) the organization's
philosophy was antithetical to school policies; and, (2) the students
had failed to show that the proposed group was sufficiently independent of the national SDS organization, which advocated and had
engaged in substantial disruption and violence in other parts of the
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

IM. at 511.
Id. at 513.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 508.
Id.
408 U.S. at 174.
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country, to allay the president's concern that the group would be
likely to engage in disruptive activity itself."
Citing Tinker, the Court noted at the outset "that state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of
the First Amendment."2 Thus, the Court specifically recognized that
the level of protection set forth in Tinker for high schools also obtained at the university level.
More importantly, the .Court extended the protections of
Tinker beyond freedom of speech to freedom of association as well.
The Court observed:
Among the rights protected by the First Amendment
is the right of individuals to associate to further their personal beliefs. While the freedom of association is not explicity set out in the Amendment, it has long been held to be
implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition.
There can be no doubt that denial of official recognition,
without justification, to college organizations burdens or
abridges that associational right. 7
The Court enunciated standards as to what would constitute
sufficient "justification" to deny recognition and related benefits by
observing that "[a]ssociational activities need not be tolerated where
they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an
education."2' Finding insufficient evidence in the record to show that
recognition of the plaintiffs' group and granting of the normal benefits incidental to recognition would bring about such disruptive
results in the instant case, the Court held that the denial of recognition on the existing record was unconstitutional.'
C.

Students' Rights Decisions in the Lower Court

In the wake of the Tinker and Healy decisions, lower courts
have been given numerous opportunities to apply the standards set
forth in those decisions and have developed a substantial body of
case law. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
relied on Healy to reverse dismissal of a complaint for injunctive
relief by students whose petition for recognition of an anti-war
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

175.
180.
181 (citations omitted).
189.
194.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1981

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1981], Art. 3
112

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW

[Vol.16

organization at a state college was denied." The college president
based the denial on the grounds that there was no "specific need"
for such an organization. The court noted that the only constitutionally proper test was whether recognition of the organization
"would substantially and materially interfere with the discipline
necessary to operate the college.""
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit enjoined University
of New Hampshire officials from prohibiting the plaintiff group, an
officially recognized gay students organization, from sponsoring
various on-campus social activities and further enjoined the officials
from treating the group differently from other recognized groups on
campus.32 Although noting that Healy specifically involved denial of
recognition while the instant case involved a recognized group that
was only being denied use of campus facilities for "gay dances," the
court observed that the "analysis in Healy focused not on the
technical point of recognition or non-recognition, but on the practicalities of human interaction.' 33 The court rejected the university's
contention that, because some activities of the group were allowed
on campus, it was permissible to restrict or prohibit others, notwithstanding the absence of a showing of material disruption'.3 Finally,
the court rejected the theory that the "social" nature of the
restricted conduct removed it from protection under the Healy rationale. The court recognized that "it is immaterial whether the
beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political,
35
economic, religious or cultural matters.
More recently, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated disciplinary action taken against Iranian student demonstrators at Jackson State University. The plaintiffs had failed to
comply with a university regulation that all demonstrations must be
registered beforehand with the Director of Student Activities, who
would then approve the holding of "activities of a wholesome
nature." The court found insufficient evidence of disruption to meet
30. Hudson v. Harris, 478 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1973).
31. Id. at 246.
32. Gay Students Org. of Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974).
33. Id. at 658 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 660.
35. Id., quoting from NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460
(1958). For similar decisions holding denial of recognition of gay students organizations
unconstitutional, see Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1080, reh. denied, 435 U.S. 981 (1978). Student Coalition for Gay
Rights v. Austin Peay State Univ., 477 F. Supp. 1267 (M.D. Tenn. 1979).
36. Shamloo v. Mississippi State Bd. of Trustees, 620 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1980).
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the two-pronged Tinker test and also determined that the regulation
governing approval of activities was impermissibly content-based as
well as excessively vague and apparently overbroad."
II.
A.

PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION
IN THE PUBLIC FORUM

Origins and Development of the Public Forum Doctrine

In the early 1970's the concept of the public forum emerged as
a guiding principle in the application of the interrelated first amendment rights of free speech and association and the fourteenth
amendment right of equal protection of the laws. Although the
origins of the doctrine can be traced back to the 1930's' and its
subsequent development is readily apparent in a series of cases and
commentaries39 during the 1960's, the Supreme Court's decision in
Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, ° is generally
cited as the decision which solidified the place of the public forum
doctrine in constitutional jurisprudence.
Mosley involved a Chicago ordinance that prohibited picketing
on a public way within 150 feet of any school building during school
hours, but expressly exempted peaceful labor picketing from the
prohibition. Citing both the first amendment and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Court struck down the
ordinance on the grounds that it created an impermissible, "contentbased" distinction between labor picketing and other peaceful
37. Id. at 522-23. For example of other situations in which lower courts have
applied these standards, see Robinson v. Board of Regents of E. Ky. Univ., 475 F.2d
707, 709 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974) ("the state, in operating a
public system of higher education, cannot condition attendance at one of its schools on
the student's renunciation of his constitutional rights"); Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d
570 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974) (restraint on distribution of student
literary magazine unconstitutional since no evidence of substantial disruption); Joyner
v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973) (cut-off of state funding to student newspaper
because of President's disagreement with view expressed was unconstitutional since
no evidence that disruption or violence would result from dissemination of newspaper);
Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973) (state requiring prior approval
of student-distributed literature at public high school and prohibiting distribution of
material that could "reasonably lead the principal to forecast substantial disruption of
or material interference with school activities" too vague and overbroad); Lawrence
Univ. Bicentennial Comm'n v. City of Appleton, 409 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Wis. 1976);
Cintron v. State Bd. of Educ., 384 F. Supp. 674 (D.P.R. 1974) (three-judge court).
38. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 688-89 (1978).
39. See e.g., Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana,
1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1 (1965).
40. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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picketing." Noting that picketing clearly involves expressive conduct protected by the first amendment, the Court stated:
[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content....
Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by
some groups, government may not prohibit others from
assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend
to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not
be based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone.2
Moreover, the Court noted that, while reasonable time, place and
manner regulations may be permissible upon a proper showing, such
regulations must be carefully scrutinized when a public forum is involved to ensure that they further only significant governmental interests. 3
The questions of what constitutes a public forum and what are
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions have been frequently addressed by the courts. In a case decided concurrently with
Mosley, the Supreme Court observed:
The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations of time, place and
manner that are reasonable.'
Essentially the same formula had been expressed a few years
earlier by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which put
forth the following test:
Does the character of the place, the pattern of the
usual activity, the nature of its essential purpose and the
population who take advantage of the general invitation
extended make it an appropriate place for communication
of views on issues of political and social significance. The
factors to be considered are essentially the same, be the
forum selected for expression a street, park, shopping
center, bus terminal, or office plaza.45
41.

Id at 94.

42.

Id. at 95-96.

43. Id. at 98-99.
44. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
45. Wolin v. New York Port Auth.,.392 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 393
U.S. 940 (1968) (citations omitted).
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Locations such as public streets, sidewalks, and parklands have
been held to be quintessential public forums because of their historic association with the broadest scope of first amendment
activities."' Other public facilities have achieved the special status of
public forums as a result of their specific adoption or designation by
authorities as a place for exchange of views among members of the
public."' Finally, public facilities that have been created for purposes
closely linked to expression, although not for unrestricted public interchange of ideas, have been recognized as "semi-public forums.""8
Several courts have indicated that public university campuses
fall at least within the last category, and are, therefore, subject to
the principle that only non-content-based, reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions may be placed on expression therein. 9
B.

Religious Expression in the Public Forum

Because public forums generally involve property owned or
maintained by the government, a question often raised is whether
permitting religious expression to take place on property recognized
as a public forum is prohibited by the establishment clause. A negative response to the question is compelled by the fact that, since the
earliest recognition of the doctrine, the Court has repeatedly held
that religious expression is entitled to full protection in public
forums. Thus, in one early decision the Court invalidated the convictions of a group of Jehovah's Witnesses for holding a Bible talk in a
city park without a permit, because the prior denial of a permit to
the group violated "the right to equal protection of the laws, in the
exercise of those freedoms of speech and religion protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. . ,," As Justice Stewart has
stated:
46. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d
931 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
47. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1976)
(municipal theater and privately owned theater leased to city were public forums).
48. The term "semi-public forum" is utilized by Professor Tribe in his treatise
to describe such facilities as schools and libraries, where the government has been
recognized as retaining a power "to preserve such tranquility as the facilities' central
purpose requires-a power that would be denied in a true public forum-but no power
to exclude peaceful speech or assembly compatible with that purpose." L. TRIaE,
AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

690.

49. See e.g., Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1315-16 (8th Cir. 1980); see also,
O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d
1345 (4th Cir. 1973); Lawrence Univ. Bicentennial Comm'n v. City of Appleton, 409 F.
Supp. 1319 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
50. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951). Similar protection for
religious expression and meetings in public forums was also recognized in Kunz v. New
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[T]here is no constitutional bar to the use of government property for religious purposes. On the contrary,
this Court has consistently held that the discriminatory
barring of religious groups from public property is itself a
violation of First and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. 1
The principle enunciated by Justice Stewart has been repeatedly affirmed in lower courts as well. Most recently, a considerable
body of case law dealing with religious expression and conduct in a
wide variety of public places has developed as a result of the litigative efforts of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness
(ISKCON). In the majority of these cases, considering many different types of public forums, the courts have upheld the right of
ISKCON members to perform their religious "sankirtan" ritual in
public facilities. In addition, courts have not been hesitant to strike
down all but the most limited time, place, and manner regulations.2
Perhaps the clearest affirmation of the principle that religious
expression in a public forum is entitled to full first amendment protection and is not prohibited by the establishment clause can be
found in the decision of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in O'Hair v. Andrus. 3 Plaintiffs, widely known as champions of
atheism, brought suit to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior and the
National Park Service from allowing the scheduled use of the National Mall in Washington, D.C., for the celebration of a mass by
Pope John Paul II during his visit to the United States. The plainYork, 340 U.S. 290 (1951), Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953), and Poulos v.
New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953).
51. School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 314 (1963)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
52. See, e.g., Jaffe v. Alexis, 659 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1981) (performance of
"sankirtan" ritual on State Department of Motor Vehicle grounds), International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Rochford, 585 F.2d 263, 270 (7th Cir. 1978) (sale of
religious literature in Chicago airports); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Englehardt, 425 F. Supp. 176 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (distribution of religious literature
at Kansas City International Airport); Swearson v. Myers, 455 F. Supp. 88, 91 (D. Kan.
1978) (distribution of literature and solicitation of funds); International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Bowen, 456 F. Supp. 437, 441 (S.D. Ind. 1978), affd, 600
, 101 S. Ct. 2563 (1981) (restriction to rental
U.S. __
F.2d 667 (1979), cert. denied, __
booth at state fair for proselytizing, distributing religious literature and soliciting
donations); Hall v. McNamara, 456 F. Supp. 245, 246 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (city permit requirements for distribution of literature or solicitation of funds); International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Walke, 453 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Wisc. 1978) (distribution
of literature in Milwaukee Airport).
U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 1433
53. 613 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, __
(1981).
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tiffs argued that such religious use of public property violated the
establishment clause. In addition, the plaintiffs argued that the
estimated expenses of more than $100,000 which the Department
would incur for incidental services rendered in connection with the
mass constituted impermissible direct financial aid to religion."'
The court of appeals rejected these arguments, holding that no
constitutional problem existed because the use was granted under
regulations that were neutral on their face and, according to the
evidence presented, applied equally to religious and non-religious activities. In reaching this decision, the court noted that the case involved a special kind of government property-public parklandwhich has been historically identified with communication among
citizens. 5 Accordingly, the court observed that "the government
may not allocate access to a public place available for communication
among citizens on the basis of the religious content of the
messages.""6
Specifically addressing the plaintiffs' argument that allowing
the Pope to conduct mass on the Mall would send an implied
message of government approval of the church service to the rest of
the world, thus constituting establishment of religion, the court
observed:
Religious and non-religious groups and events are
treated alike. No 'preference' is present. This undercuts
appellants' establishment claim. When the National Mall
is, as a matter of established policy, openly available to
the Pope, to the Reverend Moon, to Madalyn Murray
O'Hair, and to all others (religionists and anti-religionists),
there is no 'establishment of a religion,' and there cannot
be a meaningful perception of one."
III.
A.

JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF CURRICULAR AND EXTRACURRICULAR
RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

The School Prayerand Bible Reading Cases

Although there are numerous fundamental distinctions between the well-known "prayer in the public schools" decisions and
the situations presented by extracurricular, student-initiated, volun-

54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id

at
at
at
at

936.
934.
935.
934.
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tary religious activities on public campuses, an understanding of the
former group of cases is basic to an examination of the latter. This
is primarily due to the fact that the only Supreme Court decisions to
date in this area fall into the former category, the Court having
declined all opportunities, until very recently, to review the few
lower court decisions in the latter category.5 As a result, lower
courts have relied on the "prayer in the school" decisions in evaluating voluntary religious activities on public campuses without always
paying heed to constitutionally significant distinctions between the
two situations. This, in turn, has led to the application of principles
manifestly inappropriate to the circumstances. To illustrate this unfortunate development, it is first necessary to examine briefly the
Supreme Court cases involved.
1.

The Major Supreme Court Decisions

The United States Supreme Court has rendered four major
decisions involving religious exercises in the public schools.59 In
three of these decisions, the Court struck down the challenged practice as violative of the establishment clause." In the fourth, how58. See e.g., Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977); Keegan v. University of
Del., 349 A.2d 14 (Del. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). But see Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom Widmar v. Vincent, No.
80-689 (Feb. 23, 1981).
59. A fifth case was recently added to this list with the Supreme Court's deci101 S. Ct. 192 (1980).
sion and per curiam opinion in Stone v. Graham, __ U.S. -,
In a 5-4 ruling, the Court granted certiorari and simultaneously reversed the decision
of the Kentucky Supreme Court upholding a state statute that required the posting of
a copy of the Ten Commandments, purchased with private contributions, on the wall of
each public classroom in the state. Notwithstanding the statutory requirement that
each posted copy bear a notation expressly referring to the secular application of the
Ten Commandments as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and common law, and the specific findings of the state trial court that the statute had an avowed secular purpose, the Court concluded that the law had no secular legislative purpose, and was therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 193. The Court summarily dismissed
the legislature's avowed secular purpose, holding instead that the purpose for posting
the Ten Commandments was "plainly religious in nature" and the requirement was
therefore barred by the establishment clause of the Constitution. Id. at 194. The fact
that private contributions financed the program was also dismissed as irrelevant, "for
the mere posting of the copies under the auspices of the legislature provides the 'official support of the State ... Government' that the Establishment Clause prohibits."
Id
The opinion provides only a brief analysis of the issues involved, and it is not
clear what, if any, precedential value this decision, described by Justice Rehnquist in
dissent as "a cavalier summary reversal," may have. Id. at 196.
60. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); School Dist. of Abington Twp. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203
(1948).
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ever, the Court ruled that the practice constituted a permissible accommodation of religion in the public school context and did not
stray from the "safe harbor" of neutrality carved out by the first
amendment.'
In Engel v. Vitale, 62 the Court considered a New York Board of
Regents program that called for the recitation of a prayer by
students at the beginning of the school day. The prayer was nondenominational and had been composed by the Board of Regents.
While the challenged program affirmatively required the daily exercise to take place, it provided that any student who did not wish to
participate could be excused from the classroom while the prayer
was being recited. Notwithstanding this excusal provision, the Court
concluded that this exercise violated the prohibition against establishment of religion set forth in the first amendment. The Court
stated that "itis no part of the business of government to compose
official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as
part of the religious program carried on by the government." 3
The Court reached a similar conclusion one year later in School
District of Abington Township v. Schempp 4 The challenged practice in Schempp was a state-mandated program involving Bible
reading and student recitation of the Lord's Prayer at the beginning
of each school day. Despite the fact that individual participation in
the exercise was voluntary, the Court struck down the program as
violative of the establishment clause. In reaching this decision, the
Court enunciated the following test:
[Wlhat are the purpose and the primary effect of the
enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of
religion, then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. 5
Applying this test to the findings in Schempp, that the staterequired reading of Bible verses and recitation of the Lord's Prayer
were "prescribed as part of the curricular activities of students who
are required by law to attend school" and that the exercises were
held in the school buildings under the supervision and with the participation of teachers employed in those schools, the Court concluded
that the purpose and effect of the program were the advancement of

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
Id. at 425.
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
Id. at 222.
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religion." In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court was careful to note that, just as the government could not advance religion,
it was also prohibited from engaging in affirmative hostility toward
religion. 7
Over a decade before, in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Education,8 the Court invalidated a state program that required
thirty-minute religious instruction periods to be held each week,
during regular school hours, in the school classrooms. The instructors for these sessions were from outside groups, but they were
under the control of the school superintendent. While participation
in the program was voluntary, those who did not choose to participate were required to leave their classroom and go to another
location for secular instruction during the period. The Court ruled
that this state-sponsored program of religious instruction went beyond constitutionally permissible neutrality toward religion and
violated the establishment clause. 9
The lone Court decision to uphold a state program against an
0
establishment clause challenge was Zorach v. Clausen."
The program in Zorach was similar in many ways to that struck down in
McCollum, but the distinctions were found to be constitutionally
significant. In Zorach, the state authorized a program that permitted the puplic schools to release students during the school day to
attend religious instruction classes at locations off the school campus. Thus, unlike McCollum, the school classrooms were not turned
over to religious instructors and the "force of the public school" was
not used to promote the religious instruction.7 1 Participation in the
"released time" program was voluntary, but those who did not participate stayed in the classroom.
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, concluded that the program in Zorach, because of the differences from McCollum noted
above, constituted a permissible accommodation of religion in the
public school context. Finding no evidence of coercion in the "released
time" program, Justice Douglas summarily dismissed the plaintiffs'
free exercise claims. Turning to the establishment question, he emphasized that it was the state's constitutional obligation to be
66. I& at 223-24.
67. Id. at 225.

68. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
69. Id. at 212.
70. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
71. Id. at 315.
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neutral, not hostile, to religion, and such neutral accommodation was
all that was involved here."2
2.

School Prayer and Bible Reading Cases in the Lower Courts

The lower courts have applied the principles of these four decisions to a variety of state-mandated or authorized religious exercises in the public school context.73 The overriding principle that has
emerged from those decisions, and that is clearly reflected in the
contrast between McCollum and Zorach, is that religious exercises
found to be actively sponsored by the state, or found to occur under
circumstances that are likely to leave students with the impression
of ideological sponsorship by the state are impermissible, whereas
state involvement that involves no coercion and that cannot reasonably be perceived as amounting to state sponsorship does not violate
the establishment clause.74
While strict limitations have been placed on religious exercises
or observances in the classroom and as part of the school curriculum, similar exercises have been upheld as permissible accommodations when occuring in public school graduation ceremonies."5 A
72. Id at 314.
73. See Accommodating Religion in the Public Schools, 59 NEB. L. REV. 425
(1980); Toms & Whitehead, The Religious Student in Public Education: Resolving a
Constitutional Dilemma, 27 EMORY L. J. 3 (1978) [hereinafter The Religious Student].
74. A brief sampling of the lower court decisions in this area shows how this
principle has been applied to specific exercises. In Kent v. Commissioner of Educ., 402
N.E. 2d 1340, (Mass. 1980), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court struck down a
newly-enacted "school prayer" law that provided that, at the opening of each school
day, the teacher would announce that a student volunteer could pray and that students
not wishing to participate would be excused during the exercise. The court noted that
the program clearly violated the standards set forth in Schempp since "it lent no small
degree of official recognition and sanction to the religious enterprise and welded it into
the school day." Id at 1345. Thus, the court reaffirmed the principle that the
touchstones for a finding of impermissible establishment in this context are official
sponsorship and actual integration into the curriculum of the religious exercise. See
also, DeSpain v. DeKalb County Community School Dist., 384 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied., 390 U.S. 906 (1968) (recital of verse by kindergarten class prior to morning snack held impermissible even though no explicit reference to God was contained
in it); Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1965)
(kindergarten teachers allowed to stop students from reciting verse in class even
under the student's own initiative); Collins v. Chandler Unified School Dist., 470 F.
Supp. 959 (D. Ariz. 1979), modified, 644 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1981) (volunteer student
prayers at the beginning of assemblies during school hours enjoined); Ring v. Grand
Forks Pub. School Dist. #1, 483 F. Supp. 272 (D.N.D. 1980) (statute requiring posting of
Ten Commandments in every classroom held violative of establishment clause as having
purpose and primary effect of advancing religion).
75. See e.g., Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Va. 1974); Wood v.
Mt. Lebannon Twp. School Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
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comparison between the graduation cases and the decisions invalidating various exercises reveals that the significant distinction is
the compulsory, curricular nature of the exercises in the latter
group that is absent in the former. Thus, the fact that the graduation prayers occured on school property was not considered a determinative factor. Instead, "the fact that the graduation ceremony is
not compulsory strips the function of any semblance of governmental establishment or even condonation. '6
B.

Voluntary ExtracurricularReligious Meetings in Public Schools

As noted above, the classical school prayer and Bible-reading
cases differ in one basic respect from cases involving students voluntarily seeking to associate on campus for religious purposes. In the
former cases, the state is sponsoring religion as a part of the educational curriculum. The latter situation, however, generally arises in
the context of a request by a student group for permission to engage
in voluntary religious activities in school facilities and a denial of
that request by the school authorities. In recent years, a few courts
have dealt with the latter situation at the high school level, and the
resulting decisions show that the significance of this distinction has
not always been appropriately recognized.
In an early decision considering voluntary activities, the court
upheld voluntary on-campus prayer meetings, subject to certain
stated guidelines, as an appropriate accommodation of religion."'
These guidelines dealt with the time the meeting could occur, the
extent to which the supervisor/teacher could be involved, the location of the meetings and related issues. They were designed to ensure that the permitted accommodations would not be perceived as
state sponsorship."8 In short, the court sought to establish an appropriate balancing of the interests involved.
Arrayed against this decision, however, is a collection of both
federal and state rulings that have denied students' requests to permit voluntary prayer or Bible meetings in high school classrooms or
on the school grounds. In each case the stated rationale for the

76. Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Twp. School Dist., 342 F. Supp. at 1295. A similar
conclusion was reached in Deusebio, notwithstanding the court's recognition that "indirect pressures to attend" the ceremonies existed. In the court's view, those
pressures did not amount to the level of compulsoriness necessary to violate the establishment clause. 380 F. Supp. at 290.
77. Reed v. VanHoven, 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965).

78.

Id. at 54.
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court's decision has been that the grant of such a request would constitute a violation of the establishment clause.
9
Thus, in Hunt v. Board of Education,"
the court denied
students the right to meet on high school premises prior to the commencement of the school day to hold group prayer meetings. Upholding school board regulations and a state law that prohibited use
of school buildings for religious purposes, the court declined to consider the students' arguments on free speech, association, and free
exercise grounds, instead remarking that the regulations were "consistent with the well-established constitutional principle of the
separation of Church and State."80

A similar ruling was handed down by a California Court of Appeals in Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School District.1
The court ruled (2-1) that allowing a student Bible study club to
meet in a high school classroom during the lunch hour would constitute an impermissible establishment of religion.2 The high school
in Johnson had a long-standing policy of recognizing student clubs
and permitting them, once recognized, to use classrooms for club
meetings. The school also had a policy denying recognition and use
of facilities to student religious clubs. Students at the high school
petitioned for recognition of a club whose express purpose was "to
enable those participating to know God better . . .by prayerfully
studying the Bible." When recognition was denied, the students
sought injunctive relief against enforcement of the school's non-recognition policy to allow them to be recognized and meet on campus
as requested. The trial court denied the students' claim, and this
judgment was upheld by the appellate court on two major grounds.
First, focusing on the religious nature of the club's mission, the
court determined that allowing the club to meet in a public classroom would provide direct state financial support to the club in the
form of rent-free classroom space, heat, light, and supervision by a
paid faculty sponsor. Furthermore, the court stated that recognition
would place the imprimatur of the state on the club's religious activity, since the club would "become an entity 'sponsored by the
school.' "83 Based on this finding of impermissible aid and sponsor-

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

321 F. Supp. 1263
Id. at 1267.
68 Cal. App. 3d 1,
Id. at 16, 137 Cal.
Id. at 14, 137 Cal.

(S.D. W. Va. 1971).
137 Cal. Rptr. 43, cerL denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977).
Rptr. at 51.
Rptr. at 50.
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ship, the court held that the primary effect of recognizing the club
would be the advancement of religion. 4
In addition, the court ruled that granting the students' request
for recognition would result in excessive entanglement. To support
this contention, the court observed that the school would be required by law to supply a faculty sponsor to supervise the group's
activities, and would further be required to audit the club's financial
accounts and review
membership procedures to ensure compliance
5
with state law.1
The court summarily dismissed the free exercise and free
speech claims of the students holding that there was no real infringement of those rights since "[e]ach club member remains free to
believe and express his religious beliefs on an individual basis and
the students' Bible study club is free to meet as such off-campus outside of school hours. 88
More recently, in Brandon v. Board of Education8" a group of
high school students organized a group called "Students for Voluntary Prayer" and sought permission from the principal to conduct
communal prayer meetings in a classroom immediately prior to the
commencement of the school day. The school official denied the students' request. The students filed suit for injunctive and declaratory
relief and monetary damages claiming that the refusal violated their
first and fourteenth amendment rights.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
establishment clause barred student prayer meetings in the public
classrooms. The court further observed that the school's refusal did
not violate any of the rights asserted by the students, but that, even
if it had, the "compelling state interest in maintaining the separation between Church and State" justified such infringement."
84. Id,
85. Id. at 15, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
86. Id. at 18, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 52. The same rationale was employed by a New
York state appellate court in Trietley v. Board of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, 409 N.Y.S. 2d
912 (1978), to deny a request by six high school students who requested permission
from the school board to use a classroom for Bible club meetings. Despite the fact that
the request included proposed guidelines consistent with those approved in Reed v.
Van Hoven, see text accompanying notes 77-78 supra, the New York court ruled that
the proposed activities would "go beyond merely accommodating" religion and would
impermissibly aid the religious goals of the club. 65 A.D.2d at 8, 409 N.Y.S. at 917.
Conversely, the court found no violation of the plaintiffs' free exercise rights since no
state coercion was found to be involved. Id.
87. 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. filed, Feb. 17, 1981, No. 80-1396.
88. Brandon v. Board of Educ., 487 F. Supp. 1219, 1231 (1980).
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The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal. It recognized the
distinction between the school prayer and financial assistance cases,
involving state statutes supporting religious activity, and the instant case, involving a state agency refusing to sponsor religious activity in a public school. 9 Nevertheless, having expressly noted the
distinction, the court then ignored it completely in the substantive
analysis of the establishment clause issues.
According to the court, the major issue in Brandon was
whether the school's refusal violated the students' free exercise
rights and "exhibited a degree of hostility towards a particular
religious organization sufficient to transgress the principle of
government neutrality, . . . "" The court held that no constitutionally cognizable limitation was placed on the students' free exercise
rights by the school's policy." Distinguishing the "absolute" dilemmas presented in free exercise cases where the individuals were
forced to choose between neglecting their religious obligations and
rendering themselves ineligible for state benefits or liable for
criminal sanctions, " the court stated that the students' choice in the
instant case was much less difficult, since they "are free to worship
together as they please before and after the school day and on
weekends in a church or any other suitable place.""
Having concluded that no free exercise rights were infringed,
the court nevertheless went on to opine that, even if some infringement did exist, it would be justified by the compelling state interest
of avoiding the violation of the establishment clause that would
arise from the "authorization of student-initiated voluntary prayer"
in these circumstances. 4 Adopting the standard tripartite test9" for
analyzing establishment clause cases, the court conceded that a
neutral policy granting all student groups access to school facilities
reflected a permissible secular purpose of encouraging extracurricular activities. With respect to the primary effect test, however,
the court declared that:
To an impressionable student, even the mere appearance of secular involvement in religious activities
89.
90.
91.
92.
205 (1972).
93.
94.
95.
discussed in

635 F.2d at 975.
Id.
Id. at 977.
E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
635 F.2d at 977.
Id. at 978.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, reh. denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971),
text accompanying notes 108-14 infra.
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might indicate that the state has placed its imprimatur on
the particular religious creed. This symbolic inference is
too dangerous to permit .... An adolescent may perceive
"voluntary" school prayer in a different light if he were to
see the captain of the school's football team, the student
body president, or the leading actress in a dramatic production participating in communal prayer meetings in the
"captive audience" setting of a school."
Based on this speculation, for which no basis in the record appears
to have been supplied, the court concluded that the meetings would
create an "improper appearance of official support," thus impermissibly advancing religion. 7 The validity of the court's conclusions
is dubious, given the questionable characterization of the voluntary,
extracurricular, before-school meetings as a 'captive audience' setting. Presumably, any student at the meeting would have voluntarily made an affirmative effort to attend, rather than having been
forced to make an affirmative effort to excuse himself, as was the
case in Engel and Schempp. Furthermore, the characterization of
the voluntary activities of the football captain, student body president, and leading actress in a school play as likely to give the impression of official support is equally questionable.
To buttress its decision on the establishment issue, the court
also determined that granting the students' request would have
resulted in excessive entanglement of the school in religion, thus
violating the third element of the establishment test." This holding
was based on the fact that the school officials were under a statutory duty to provide adequate supervision of students, and this monitoring, as well as necessary "surveillance ... to guarantee that participation in the prayer meetings would always remain voluntary"
would, in the court's view, inevitably result in excessive entanglement. " Again, however, the court's argument strains credibility
when it suggests that the faculty member's monitoring will
necessarily consist of intrusive "surveillance" rather than largely
perfunctory supervision.
Having devoted the bulk of its analysis to the free exercise and
establishment clause arguments, the court summarily dismissed the
96. Id. at 978.
97. Id. at 979.
98. Id
99. Id See also, Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68
Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977). discussed in text accompanying notes 81-86 supra.
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free speech, free association and equal protection claims of the
students. First, the court ruled that "a high school is not a 'public
forum' where religious views can be freely aired."1 ° Significantly,
the court distinguished the high school context from that of a public
university, "where religious speech and association cannot be prohibited.'.. 1 In addition, noting "the explicit Establishment Clause
proscription against prayer in the public schools," the court concluded that the free speech rights of the students, cognizable in a public
forum, "are severely circumscribed by the Establishment Clause in
1
the public school setting.""
C.

Distinctions Between Secondary and College Levels

The last point discussed in Brandon is very significant. In
determining the precedential value, if any, that the foregoing cases
might have in a discussion of student rights at the college level,
some critical factual distinctions must be borne in mine. The most
obvious of these distinctions involves the relative ages of the
students. As one commentator has observed:
Engel, Schempp, and such other church-state-education cases ...involved children in elementary or secondary schools, i.e., at a different age level than students in
public higher education. Students in elementary and secondary schools come under compulsory school attendance
laws whereas these laws do not apply to students in
public higher education. Furthermore, there is an obvious
difference in maturity level between a student in the
eighth or ninth grade, for example, and a college or
university student. Such factors as differences in age and
maturity level could be of considerable importance in determining the constitutionality of some practices at the
higher education level."0 '
Courts have repeatedly emphasized the constitutionally significant distinction between elementary and secondary levels of education, on the one hand, and college level education on the other. 4 As
the Court of Appeals observed in O'Hair v. Andrus:

100. 635 F.2d at 980.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Michaelson, The Supreme Court and Religion in Public Higher Education,
13 J. PUB. L. 343, 345 (1964).
104. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 750, 764
(1976) (opinion of Blackmun, J.); Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d at 1319.
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Appellants' reliance on cases treating elementary
and secondary schools is inappropriate. Because of their
central and delicate role in American life, and because of
the unique susceptibility of their captive audience, children, to coercion, the public schools have a special insulation from religious ceremony. Different considerations apply to colleges and universities, where the likelihood of
coercion is less. .... 105
The O'Hair passage notes another distinction between the
school prayer cases and the situation that exists when college students seek to meet on campus for religious activities. Students in
the first group are compelled to be in attendance at the school,
while students in the second group are not. Thus, at the college
level the notion of a "captive audience" is much less, if at all,
tenable. Indeed, the difference in holdings between the graduation
prayer cases and the opening school prayer cases reflects an understanding that, in the absence of compulsory attendance, even at the
same educational level, the danger of establishment is significantly
diminished.
Finally, a significant distinction that will often present itself is
the residential nature of colleges that is not normally found at the
elementary or secondary public education level. Thus, where the college student lives in the campus community on a full-time basis,
there is a much greater need for accommodation of on-campus opportunities for all types of interaction-including those of a religious
nature-than exists where the student is living at home, in the community at large.' 51
IV.

THE THREE-PRONGED TEST OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

The first amendment concurrently prohibits laws "respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof." Judicial interpretation of these clauses reflects the strong
and constant tension between them that can only be resolved, in a
given factual situation, by the government's benevolent neutrality
toward religion."' As the influence of government has increased
dramatically in all spheres of society, and especially in the area of
education, benevolent neutrality has become increasingly difficult to
achieve.
105. 613 F.2d at 936.
106. See Keegan v. University of Del., 349 A.2d 14 (Del. 1975), discussed in
text accompanying notes 115-17 infra.
107. E.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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The Supreme Court set forth a fairly simple test in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,"8 that has subsequently been invoked to determine
whether laws apparently aiding religion violate the establishment
clause. This three-pronged test states:
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the
statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' 0 9
Although applied since its inception in virtually every situation
in which the establishment clause is implicated, this tripartite test
has received its greatest refinement in the area of financial aid to
religiously-affiliated private schools and colleges. In this context, the
test has been used both to uphold some forms of aid"' and to invalidate others."'
In reviewing these and other establishment cases, it appears
that the standard of secular purpose is the easiest to apply and to
satisfy. " 2 The primary effect test has proved more problematic.
Nevertheless, it is clear "that not every law that confers an 'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'incidental' benefit upon religious institutions is,
for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid."1 1 3 Rather, a law must
have a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion to violate
the second part of the test.
Finally, the mechanism by which the aid is granted cannot
result in excessive entanglement of the government agency administering the program with the religious institution receiving the
aid. In applying this third prong of the test, the court must deter108.
109.

403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).

110.

See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Roemer

v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (noncategorical grants that could not be used
for sectarian purposes); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, reh. denied, 422 U.S. 1049
(1975) (state program for lending textbooks to private school students upheld, although
other aspects of program invalidated).
111. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (state
tuition grants and building funds for private schools had impermissible primary effect
of advancing religion); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
112.

But see, Stone v. Graham,

-

U.S.-

101 S. Ct. 192 (1980) (Kentucky

statute requiring posting of Ten Commandments in public classrooms invalidated
because, inter alia, the Court rejected the legislature's statement and the state court's
finding of the avowed secular purpose of exposing students to the fundamental legal
code of Western Civilization).
113. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 771.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1981

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1981], Art. 3
130

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

mine whether a significant amount of government surveillance is
necessary to ensure that the benefit granted is not being diverted to
impermissible ends. If such surveillance is found to be required, so
that an "intimate and continuing relationship between church and
state" is created, the third prong of the test will not be satisfied."'
V.

SPECIFIC ISSUES LIKELY TO BE CONFRONTED

BY STUDENT RELIGIOUS GROUPS SEEKING
TO BE ACTIVE ON THE COLLEGE CAMPUS

A.

Religious Activities At the College Level

The major areas of constitutional development set forth in the
previous sections-increasing recognition of student constitutional
rights, long-standing protection of religious expression in the public
forum, the search for permissible accommodation of religion in the
context of student religious activities in public schools, and the development of the tripartite establishment test primarily in the context of public aid to religious schools-have recently converged in
three cases that have directly confronted the question of college
students' rights to organize and meet for religious purposes on
public campuses. Not surprisingly, given the wide variety of interests that must be reconciled in attempting to apply simultaneously the doctrines set forth in the previous sections, the decisions
reflect widely divergent viewpoints and conclusions.
115
the university sought
In Keegan v. University of Delaware,
to prohibit students' use of a dormitory commons room on campus
for worship services. The university contended that the ban was required by the establishment clause. The Delaware Supreme Court
rejected this argument and reversed the lower court injunction
upholding the ban. The court stated that "[t]o allow religious worship groups the same rights and privileges attendant with the use of
the commons room of the dormitory as are accorded other group activities could reflect lawful accommodation." '

The court concluded that:
The University [could not] support its absolute ban of
all religious worship on the theory that, without such a
114. For an excellent discussion of the history of the excessive entanglement
test, see Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses - A Ten Year Assessment, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1195 (1980).
115. 349 A.2d 14 (Del. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934, reh. denied, 425 U.S.
945 (1976).
116. 349 A.2d at 16.
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ban, University policy allowing all student groups, including religious groups, free access to dormitory common
areas would necessarily violate the Establishment
Clause." 7
Thus, although not specifically mentioned, the concept of equal access for religious expression to public facilities was clearly applied
by the court.
The opinion of the district court in Dittman v. Western Washington Univeristy,"' presents a distinct contrast to the Keegan decision. In Dittman, plaintiff students and recognized student associations sought to enjoin the enforcement of the university's policy
which: (1) restricted the use of university classrooms and auditoriums by groups for religious worship, exercise, or instruction to two
times per quarter, and (2) required payment of full rental value for
each such use. Noting that other recognized student groups were
allowed to use the facilities rent-free on a first-come, first-served
basis for non-religious activities, the plaintiffs argued that the
policy, inter alia, violated their rights to free speech, free association, and free exercise of religion, as well as their right to equal protection of the laws. In addition, the students challenged a related
university policy that any monies collected on campus by the respective groups were deemed to be state funds that had to be turned
over to the university and could not be used for religious activities.
The university contended in response that both of these policies
represented the most liberal accommodation of student religious activities on campus that the establishment clause permits.
The district court dismissed the students' action, adopting the
position asserted by the university "that it would be a violation of
the Establishment Clause . ..for the University to make its facilities available on a regular basis to religious groups for religious purposes," because to do so "would constitute an advancement of religion by the state."".9 The court acknowledged that first amendment
rights are fully applicable in the university setting, that contentbased restrictions on expression may not be imposed by the government, and that religious speech is generally to be afforded the same
protection as other forms of expression. Furthermore, the court
summarily conceded, in applying the tripartite establishment test,
117. Id.
118. No. C79-1189V (W.D. Wash., Feb. 27, 1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-3120
(9th Cir., Apr. 7, 1980).
119. Id., slip op. at 5.
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that "a policy which permitted free access to University facilities
without regard to the purpose of the assembly would clearly not be
violative of the [excessive entanglement] criteria, and a secular purpose might be found in the exchanging of ideas and the sharing of
interests by those in attendance."" The court nevertheless concluded that failure to adhere to the challenged policy would have a primary effect of advancing religion by "placing the imprimatur of
government upon the religious activities being conducted in [the]
facilities."'' 1
The free exercise claims of the plaintiffs were not considered
sufficient to counterbalance the perceived compelling state interest
of avoiding the establishment of religion. Noting that the policy affected only practices and not beliefs, that the ban was not absolute
in view of the two times per quarter rule, and that off-campus facilities were available for plaintiffs' religious exercises, the court determined that the unquestionable interference with the exercise of
plaintiffs' sincerely-held religious beliefs was not sufficiently severe
to outweigh the perceived establishment problems that an opposite
policy would create. In one sentence, the court noted that this deterthe plaintiffs' claim as to free speech and
mination "also resolves
22
associational rights.1
The court also ruled that the university could not supply any
funds-for religious or non-religious purposes-to the religious
groups. This ruling was based on the state constitution and on the
establishment clause, since the court found that "the continuing
supervision, justification, and debate, accompanying the use of state
funds by religious groups, unavoidably entangles the state in matters of religion."' 2 3 Accordingly, the court modified the university
funding policy that had previously allowed the groups to obtain
state funds for non-religious activities. Under the court's decision,
all state funding was terminated, but the groups were given the
right to collect and retain all funds raised, whether obtained on or
24
off campus.
In Chess v. Widmar,12 5 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the reasoning of Dittman and reached the same result as in
120. Id., slip op. at
121. Id.
122. Id., slip op. at
123. Id., slip op. at
124. Id.
125. 635 F.2d 1310
No. 80-689 (Feb. 23, 1981).
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Keegan-upholding the students' right to use campus facilities for
voluntary religious worship meetings -although relying on somewhat different grounds.'" Chess involved regulations established by
the University of Missouri-Kansas City that prohibited "religious
worship or religious teaching" in any university buildings or on the
campus grounds. Appellants were members of an officially recognized religious student organization who were denied permission,
under the regulation, to use a lecture hall on campus for Bible
study, prayer, singing of hymns, and other religious activity. The
general policy of the university was to permit recognized student
associations to use various university facilities for lectures, discussion groups, meetings, symposia, and similar programs.
The university denied appellants the use of the facilities on the
grounds that such a policy was required to preserve the separation
of church and state under the establishment clause. The district
court granted the summary judgment motion of the defendant university administrators on these grounds."7
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that none of the three
elements of the establishment clause framework would be violated
by allowing the students to hold their religious meetings on
campus."' 8 The district court in Chess had noted that the first and
third parts of the test-secular purpose and avoidance of entanglement-did not support the prohibitory policy, and the Court of Appeals agreed.
The district court . . . recognized that 'A [neutral]
university policy that permitted any student group to
meet in university-owned buildings for any purpose would
aid all student groups, regardless of religious affiliation
and would, therefore, reflect a clear secular purpose. In
addition, since such a policy would make no distinction between groups or their purposes, entanglement with religion would be completely avoided.' . . .
We agree with the district court that a neutral policy
would have a secular purpose and would avoid an entanglement with religion.'

126. 635 F.2d at 1317.
127. Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1979). The court relied
primarily on Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, reh. denied, 404 U.S. 874 (1971).
128. 635 F.2d at 1320.
129. Id. at 1317 (emphasis in original).
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The district court rested its ultimate decision on the view that
a neutral policy (i.e., permitting religious as well as other groups to
meet on campus) would have the primary effect of advancing religion. This view the Court of Appeals soundly rejected:
We cannot agree, however, that such a policy would
have the primary effect of advancing religion. Rather, it
would have the primary effect of advancing the University's admittedly secular purpose-to develop students'
"social and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curiosity." It would simply permit students to put
their religious ideas and practices in competition with the
ideas and practices of other groups, religious or secular. It
would no more commit the University, its administration
or its faculty to religious goals than they are now committed to the goals of the Students for Democratic Society,
the Young Socialist Alliance, the Young Democrats or the
Women's Union.
Furthermore, a neutral policy would not be an "establishment" as that term was understood by the framers
of the First Amendment.
Under a neutral policy, the University would not
sponsor religious worship or teaching; sponsorship would
lie with the recognized student groups. Financial support
would be minimal. Finally, there would be no active involvement of the sovereign because the University's role
would be limited to determining the time, place and manner of the event and would not extend to approval or
disapproval of content.8 0
The Court of Appeal thus concluded:
UMKC has the right, as do all public universities, to
recognize student groups that seek to associate for the advancement of any and all ideas. It has exercised this right
and has opened certain of its facilities to recognized student groups for lectures, discussions, symposiums, meetings, events and programs. But UMKC has denied access
to these facilities to one such recognized student group
based solely on its conclusion that the group's meetings
include either religious worship or religious teaching. This
130.

1&
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denial clearly burdens the constitutional rights of the
group's members and is not justified by a compelling state
interest in avoiding an establishment of religion. A
neutral accommodation of the many student groups active
at UMKC would not constitute an establishment of religion even though some student groups may use the
University's facilities for religious worship or religious
teaching. Therefore, UMKC's regulation No. 4.0314.0107,
which prohibits religious worship and religious teaching in
the University's buildings or on its grounds, is not required by the Establishment Clause. Because of the
burden it imposes on the rights guaranteed to the appellants by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
federal Constitution, the regulation is invalid. '

B.

Official Recognition

Virtually every system of state colleges and universities provides for official recognition of student organizations. The general
rationale for promoting student association in this manner is to encourage students to join together, within the academic community,
for the purpose of pursuing common interests beyond the scope of
the formal curriculum. 32' In addition to fostering a beneficial atmosphere for student association, however, the standard procedures involved with official recognition also give the institution control over
what activities will be permitted on campus. This control arises both
from the requirements that are imposed by the university on students seeking recognition and from the grant of benefits to groups
who meet the requirements and attain recognized status.
It is this latter aspect-which generally involves the ability to
use campus facilities, publicize activities, invite speakers-that
makes official recognition so crucial. As the Court observed in Healy
v. James:
Denial of official recognition posed serious problems
for the organization's existence and growth. Its members
131. Id. at 1320. The university filed a petition for certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court, and, as indicated above, that petition was granted on February
23, 1981. The decision to grant a review of the decision is somewhat surprising, in light
of the fact that no conflict among the courts of appeal existed, this being the first decision at that level. It should be noted that the appeal of the Dittman case in the Ninth
Circuit has been argued and is now under submission. Oral arguments were heard by
the Court in Widmar on Oct. 6, 1981, and the case is now under submission.
132. See, e.g., Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d at 1312 n.1 (UMKC recognition policy
statement).
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were deprived of the opportunity to place announcements
regarding meetings, rallies, or other activities in the student newspaper; they were precluded from using various
campus bulletin boards; and-most importantly-nonrecognition barred them from using campus facilities for
holding meetings.'33
The implications of granting or withholding each of these incidental benefits are examined separately below. However, it is important to consider whether mere official recognition of a student
religious group, without more, might be perceived as raising a problem under the establishment clause and thus be raised as grounds
for denying such recognition.
Indeed, several universities have attempted to justify refusal
to grant recognition to various groups on the grounds that it would
constitute implied approval by the university of activities or beliefs
with which the university did not necessarily agree." With respect
to religious groups, the argument relies on decisions holding that
state sponsorship of religion is clearly impermissible and asserts
that mere official recognition by the school is enough to constitute
such sponsorship.
Assuming that recognition is granted to religious and non-religious groups alike, this argument should be rejected. In Student
Coalition for Gay Rights v. Austin Peay State University,135 the university asserted the defense of avoiding implicit approval of the
group's views to justify the denial of recognition for a gay students'
organization. Rejecting this defense, the court observed:
Recognition by APSU of an organization is neither
explicit nor implicit approval of the organization, its goals,
or purposes. To insist otherwise would involve the University in impossible contradictions. Would not the University "recognize" both the Student Christian Association and the Jewish Student Organization, or even the
Student Atheist Society? Would it grant recognition to
the Jewish Defense League but deny it to the Palestinian
Student Association? Would it recognize the American
Nazi Party but deny recognition to the NAACP? What
about Young Republicans versus Young Democrats? Ap133.
134.
135.

Healy v. James, 408 U.S. at 176.
See, e.g., Gay Lib. v. Univ. of Mo., 558 F.2d 848.
477 F. Supp. 1267 (M.D. Tenn. 1979).
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proval or disapproval based upon explicit or implicit
agreement with the content of the advocacy is contrary to
the very core of a University's goal of eclectic examination, but more importantly to this dispute, cannot pass
constitutional muster."6
Thus, where the university maintains a policy of officially
recognizing student groups of all social, political, and other interests
and viewpoints, and allows a religious group the same opportunity
as other groups to gain recognized status, "there is no 'establishment of a religion,' and there cannot be a meaningful perception of
3 7
one."
C.

Use of Campus Facilities

Beyond the threshold issue of recognition, the most critical
issue is whether a group will be permitted to meet on campus to further its religious purposes. The right to utilize campus facilities,
although technically only an incident of recognition at most universities, is generally at the heart of students' rights conflicts. Moreof the associational rights
over, this right is the most fundamental
38
that a university must provide.
The Supreme Court has clearly sanctioned some restrictions on
the use of public campus facilities by students, in view of the
"special characteristics of the school environment."'3 9 The permissible extent of those restrictions, however, is strictly limited to time,
place, and manner considerations that go no further than is necessary to ensure that the use will not materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school or will not invade or collide with the rights of
other students. Only a showing that a real threat of disruption
exists will suffice to establish the existence of the necessary compelling state interest. 4
Moreover, it is equally clear that, even if more restrictive time,
place, and manner limitations are allowed on school grounds than in
more open public forums, such as parks, universities still may not
constitutionally restrict the use of campus facilities by student

136.
137.
1018, 1022.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 1273.
O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d at 934. See also, Jaffe v. Alexis, 659 F.2d
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. at 181.
See, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503.
See text accompanying notes 13-29 supra.
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organizations solely on the basis of the content of expression that
will take place therein."' Notwithstanding this clear prohibition on
content-based restrictions, however, several universities and some
courts have asserted that such restrictions are justified where the
content -of the speech is religious. The compelling state interest
asserted is not the avoidance of disruption, however, but the alleged
need to avoid an impermissible establishment of religion by the university. According to this argument, establishment results largely
from the indirect financial aid that the religious group receives in
the form of rent-free space, heating, and lighting, for example." 2 Providing this aid, it is contended, has the primary effect of advancing
religion.
The Constitution, however, has never been held to require that
no government aid whatsoever may benefit religious groups.' If the
aid is extended in the context of a program whose purpose and primary effect are secular, the aid is permissible. That is precisely the
situation that exists when student religious groups are permitted to
use campus facilities in the context of a general policy making such
facilities available to all student groups alike."'
It is often argued that even if denial of campus facilities to
religious groups does create some infringement on those groups'
rights of free exercise, free speech or free association, the infringement and resulting burden are not substantial, since students may
utilize off-campus facilities to conduct their meetings. As a factual
matter, this argument may be simply untenable in many situations,
since many universities provide the whole community for resident
students, making off-campus alternatives substantially less accessible or desireable." '5 However, even if such alternatives are available
at a given campus, this argument is directly contrary to the Court's
observation that "the group's possible ability to exist outside the
campus community does not ameliorate significantly the disabilities
imposed" by the prohibition.' 6 In short, the correct view is that the
141. See text accompanying notes 50-57 8upra.
142. See, e.g., Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310; Johnson v. Huntington Beach
Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43.
143. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 97 U.S. 664 (1970).
144. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d at 1317. See also, O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d
at 937.
145. See, e.g., Keegan v. Univ. of Del., 349 A.3d at 16.
146. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. at 183. See also, Gay Students Org. of the Univ.
of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d at 660 (court rejected argument "that, so long as an
association is allowed to meet, restrictions on some of its activities are permissiblei.e., that it is enough that the glass is half full.") Accord, Southeastern Promotions Ltd.
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availability of alternative forums is constitutionally irrelevant when
considering the right of student groups to meet on campus.
It might be argued that a university that prohibits religious
groups from meeting on campus need not show that permitting such
meetings would necessarily result in impermissible establishment,
but merely that such a prohibitory policy fulfills a "compelling state
interest" by allowing the university to stay far away from any perception of sponsorship or involvement with religion. This argument,
however, not only ignores the standards set forth in Tinker and
Healy, but it also begs the fundamental issue. If it cannot be shown
that permitting such meetings would, in fact, violate the establishment clause, then a "compelling state interest" in avoiding the perception of establishment simply cannot exist.
Finally, the practical application of regulations prohibiting only
religious meetings while permitting all other types of student meetings must ultimately result in the very "excessive entanglement"
that the establishment clause prohibits. In many instances, recognized student religious organizations are informed that on-campus
meetings for social or business purposes are permissible as long as
religious expression and activities are not involved. In order to
determine how such a restriction applies to a given meeting or activity, however, an administrative official must determine, often
before the meeting or activity takes place, whether it will be "religious" or not. Given the difficulty which courts have faced in trying
to resolve this issue, it is inconceivable that a university administrator should be put in the position of having to make such determinations. For example, if a meeting is held to discuss the views of the
Moral Majority and their impact on society, how should such a meeting be classified? As the court observed in Chess v. Widmar, a
"neutral policy" avoids the "excessive entanglement" problems
necessarily raised by any attempt to answer this question.' 7
D. Right to Publicity and Distribution of Literature on Campus
As the Supreme Court has observed, the ability of student
groups to publicize their activities or views to other students by
posting materials and distributing literature on campus is another

v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975) (availability of alternative private forum does not
justify otherwise impermissible prior restraint, since "one is not to have the exercise
of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be
exercised in some other place").
147. 635 F.2d 1310, 1317.
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vital aspect of student associational rights.'48 Accordingly, limitations on the ability to publicize are subject to the same strict first
amendment standards. This view is expressed in a series of lower
court decisions striking down school regulations that imposed prior
approval requirements on the distribution of materials by students.
While these decisions recognize the right of university officials to
establish a prior review procedure, they hold that such procedures
must be narrowly drafted so that they can only be used to prohibit
distribution of materials in "situations where school functioning is
materially disrupted or the rights of students substantially infringed. 149
It seems clear that any administration policy that singles out
and prohibits free religious literature distribution or posting of
materials publicizing activities of religious student groups will run
afoul of the constitutional requirements. Whether constitutional protection extends to the operation of a booktable by a religious student group where religious literature is sold in return for donations
to the group is a closer question. Nevertheless, if other groups are
permitted to distribute or sell literature or sponsor events in return
for monetary donations, the same principle of non-discrimination
should apply.
E.

Right to Invite Outside Speakers on Campus

A further benefit that is often granted to recognized student
groups is the right to invite non-student speakers to come onto the
campus for the purpose of addressing club meetings, general student body gatherings and similar functions. The circumstances
under which individual speakers may be denied this right was a
question faced by several courts during the 1960's.15 The willingness
of courts to strike down such bans is clearly rooted in the constitu148. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. at 181.
149. Cintron v. State Bd. of Educ., 384 F. Supp. 674, 679 (D.P.R. 1974). In Jones
v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Ariz., 436 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1970), the court considered
a university regulation that prohibited handbilling anywhere on campus grounds,
"even the portions thereof which ... are open to the public generally," with the exception that handbills authorized by the university could be handed out in classrooms during
authorized group meetings. l at 619-20, 622. The court struck down the regulation,
noting that it was too broad to be justified as necessary to prevent disruption. Id at
622. See also, Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975); Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973).
150. Significantly, as one court pointed out several years later, speaker bans
fared extremely poorly in the federal courts during that decade. Pickings v. Bruce, 430
F.2d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 1970) (unable to find a single case decided in 1960's in which
speaker ban upheld by federal court).
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tional aversion to prior restraints in general and in the careful protection of first amendment rights in public forums.
These principles have been specifically applied to strike down a
regulation aimed at religious speakers. In Stacy v. Williams,"' a
three-judge court struck down as unconstitutionally discriminatory a
regulation governing state universities in Mississippi that provided
that university facilities "shall not be made available for public
religious meetings or gatherings to off campus persons or groups of
1 2
persons.""
In striking down this regulation, the Court concluded:
[A]s this regulation can reasonably be construed to
mean that no student religious group may invite outside
speakers on religious topics, which prohibition would conflict with the Equal Protection Clause, it must be rejected,
and, if revised, must specifically be confined to forbidding
only religious services conducted on the campus by persons having no connection with the university.153
The court in Stacy thus implicitly recognized the right of
religious student groups to meet on state university campuses and
explicitly held that the differential treatment of such groups with
respect to the presentation of outside speakers on campus constituted an impermissible classification in violation of the equal protection clause."5
F. Right to Funding
The ability to obtain university funding for club activities is
often another concomitant of official recognition. Whether there is
an absolute constitutional right to such funding, however, is unclear.
Furthermore, in the case of student religious groups, the issue of
direct financial aid obviously raises serious establishment issues.
If the university makes funding available to some groups but
denies it to others on the basis of the ideas they express, a group so
denied would appear to have a claim for relief under the equal protection clause. Similarly, if the university withdraws previously
granted funding solely based on disagreement with some non-disruptive act or expression of the group, a constitutional violation is likely to be found. 5
151. 306 F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
152. Id. at 975 n.28.
153. Id at 975-76.
154. Id
155. See, e.g., Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973); Brooks v.
Auburn Univ., 296 F. Supp. 188 (M.D. Ala.), 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969).
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However, if the university merely chooses to adopt a non-discriminatory policy of not providing student clubs with funds for
their activities, it is not settled whether a constitutional violation
exists. In other words, the question is whether funding, like use of
campus facilities, is a necessary element of the right of association
in the university context."6
The Court expressly left this question open in Healy.'5 As a
result, at least one commentator has concluded that direct funding is
not an associational right the university must grant.1 5 This position
was implicitly confirmed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Maryland Public Interest Research Group v. Elkins.'59 In that case
the group was granted university funds, but the grant was subject
to a stipulation that none of the money received would be used to
pay litigation expenses. The Court upheld the stipulation, noting
that "there is no affirmative commandment upon the University to
activate [the group's] exercise of First Amendment guarantees ... "10
Even if it is assumed, however, that a funding requirement
does exist, or if it is shown that funding is provided generally by a
university, there is a serious question whether the giving of such
funds to a religious student group is prohibited by the establishment clause. That such aid is prohibited was clearly the opinion of
the district court in Dittman.
Such funding is also a violation of the Establishment
Clause, for when state funds are provided to a religious
group, there is no means of ensuring that those funds are
not spent for religious purposes. The continuing supervision, justification, and debate, accompanying the use of
state funds by religious groups, unavoidably entangles the
state in matters of religion. 1 '
As is clearly reflected in the court's brief explanation in Dittman, the prospect of permitting religious student groups to receive
student activity funds under any circumstances would appear to
create substantial, if not insurmountable, establishment clause problems. As a practical matter, therefore, a student religious group
seeking to convince a university administrator that it is entitled to
156.
157.
159.
159.
160.
161.

See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169.
Id. at 182 n.8.
See Beyond Tinker, supra note 4, at 1710-11.
565 F.2d 864 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1008 (1978).
Id. at 866.
Slip op. at 11.
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associational rights on campus equal to those of other student
groups might be well-advised to forego a claim to student funding,
even if such funding is granted to non-religious groups.
CONCLUSION

As the foregoing analysis indicates, the issues facing the
Supreme Court as it takes up the case of Widmar v. Vincent are
complex. It has been almost twenty years since the Court's last major decision on prayer in the public schools and a decade since the
cornerstone students' rights decisions of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District and Healy v. James. It remains
to be seen to which of these lines of decisions the Widmar case will
be added. In the authors' opinion, the principles underlying both the
relevant clauses of the Constitution and the relevant decisions of the
Court clearly mandate an affirmation of the students' right to meet.
Nevertheless, whether that result or the opposite is reached, one
thing is certain: the decision in Widmar6 2 will have a highly significant impact on college life for years to come.
162. While this issue was in press, Widmar v. Vincent was decided. The Court
held that the exclusionary policy of the University of Missouri at Kansas City violated
the fundamental principle that state regulation of speech should be content-neutral. 50
U.S.L.W. 4062 (U.S. Dec. 8. 1981), aft'g, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980).
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